As Dean of the Jose Maria College of Law, Davao City, I believe that the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds vote of all the Members of the Senate for conviction in an impeachment case must be strictly, faithfully, and solemnly observed.
This is not a novel constitutional question, nor is the requirement peculiar to the impeachment proceedings against Vice President Sara Duterte. The requirement of a supermajority for conviction has deep roots in Philippine constitutional history.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the protection was even more stringent. Article IX, Section 3 provided:
“No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate.”
Thus, our original republican Constitution required not merely two-thirds, but three-fourths of the entire Senate before an impeachable officer could be removed from office.
When the 1973 Constitution transferred the impeachment power to the Batasang Pambansa, it retained the principle of a supermajority. Article XIII, Section 3 commanded:
“No official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members thereof.”
The 1987 Constitution preserved that same fundamental safeguard. Article XI, Section 3(6) now expressly provides:
“No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”
The constitutional history is therefore unmistakable: from the three-fourths requirement under the 1935 Constitution, to the two-thirds requirement under the 1973 Constitution, and finally to the two-thirds-of-all-Senators requirement under the 1987 Constitution, our constitutional tradition has consistently demanded a supermajority before the extraordinary power of impeachment may result in removal from office.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission are particularly instructive. Commissioner Francisco Rodrigo specifically observed:
“Under the 1935 Constitution, the vote needed in the Senate was three-fourths. Now it is being reduced to two-thirds, is that correct?”
Commissioner Florenz Regalado answered:
“That is right.”
Commissioner Regalado further explained that under the 1973 Constitution, “the vote needed to convict was two-thirds.”
Thus, the Framers consciously considered the numerical threshold. Two-thirds was not an accidental phrase inserted into the Constitution. It was the product of constitutional deliberation against the backdrop of our previous Constitutions.
The Supreme Court has likewise repeatedly recognized the special and extraordinary nature of impeachment.
In Republic v. Sereno, the Court discussed the historical development of Philippine impeachment and noted that under the 1935 Constitution the framers sought to discourage impeachment charges driven merely by partisan considerations, considering, among others, the “three-fourths vote of the Senate to convict.” The Court also traced how the impeachment provisions evolved through the 1973 Constitution and ultimately into the present Constitution.
The Court’s discussion of Philippine impeachment history is equally significant. It characterized impeachment as “sui generis” and explained that, because of our country’s “distinct political history,” its concept, nature, and process have developed as a uniquely constitutional mechanism of accountability.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has treated the words “all the Members of the Senate” as consequential. In its earlier ruling involving the impeachment of Vice President Duterte, the Court expressly stated:
“conviction in an impeachment case requires the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.”
It further observed that a smaller group of senators could not “render a judgment of conviction in an impeachment case.”
This constitutional requirement has an important democratic rationale.
Vice President Sara Duterte was elected by more than 32 million Filipinos. Those votes represent the sovereign electoral choice of an enormous segment of our people. Her electoral mandate does not, of course, immunize her from accountability. No elected official is above the Constitution.
But neither may the electoral will of millions of Filipinos be overturned casually, expediently, or by reducing a constitutional threshold after the fact.
The votes cast by more than 32 million Filipinos are not simply numbers appearing in an election return. They represent the exercise of popular sovereignty. The Constitution therefore appropriately requires an extraordinary degree of concurrence before the Senate may overturn the people’s electoral judgment and remove a nationally elected constitutional officer.
That is precisely why the Constitution does not say two-thirds of the Senators present, two-thirds of those voting, or two-thirds of a quorum. It says two-thirds of “all the Members of the Senate.”
Every word must be given effect.
Moreover, the present impeachment proceedings commenced under that constitutional understanding. The prosecution, the defense, the Senate sitting as an impeachment court, and the Filipino people all entered these proceedings knowing that conviction requires the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
That constitutional finish line cannot fairly be moved simply because obtaining the required votes later proves difficult.
The burden rests upon the prosecution to present evidence sufficiently compelling to persuade the constitutionally required number of Senator-Judges. The constitutional threshold cannot be adjusted to compensate for any perceived weakness in the evidence or difficulty in securing the necessary votes.
The Supreme Court’s own words concerning impeachment are particularly appropriate here. In its 2025 decision involving Vice President Duterte, the Court declared:
“Our fundamental law is clear: the end does not justify the means.”
And, even more significantly:
“There is a right way to do the right thing at the right time.”
The Court added that this principle of fairness and due process applies “even for impeachment.”
Those words capture the constitutional issue perfectly.
Accountability is important. But constitutional accountability cannot be achieved by disregarding the very Constitution invoked in the name of accountability.
Whether one supports or opposes Vice President Sara Duterte should therefore be immaterial. The Constitution must operate with the same force regardless of the identity of the respondent.
Today, the two-thirds requirement may protect an official whom some Filipinos strongly oppose. Tomorrow, the same constitutional safeguard may protect an official whom those very same Filipinos strongly support.
That is precisely why constitutional rules cannot change depending upon personalities or political circumstances.
The two-thirds requirement is not a technicality standing in the way of justice. It is part of the constitutional architecture of justice itself.
To diminish it, reinterpret it opportunistically, or calculate it using anything less than all the Members of the Senate would not simply prejudice one Vice President. It would weaken a constitutional safeguard that has existed, in one supermajority form or another, throughout the constitutional history of the Republic.
